Meta Ontology

first page

• 413

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• @article{Franklin2014-FRAELF,author = {Christopher Evan Franklin},number = {3},abstract = {Event-causal libertarians maintain that an agent's freely bringing about a choice is reducible to states and events involving him bringing about the choice. Agent-causal libertarians demur, arguing that free will requires that the agent be irreducibly causally involved. Derk Pereboom and Meghan Griffith have defended agent-causal libertarianism on this score, arguing that since on event-causal libertarianism an agent's contribution to his choice is exhausted by the causal role of states and events involving him, and since these states and events leave it open which decision he will make, he does not settle which decision occurs, and thus ''disappears.'' My aim is to explain why this argument fails. In particular, I demonstrate that event-causal libertarians can dismantle the argument by enriching the reductive base in their analysis of free will to include a state that plays the functional role of the self-determining agent and with which the agent is identified},journal = {Philosophical Studies},pages = {413--432},title = {Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument},volume = {170},year = {2014}}@

has title

• Event-Causal Libertarianism, Functional Reduction, and the Disappearing Agent Argument

is published in

• 2014

last page

• 432