Meta Ontology

first page

• 87

has Bibtex metadata

• @article{Stanley2010-STAAAI-2,title = {\&Quot;assertion" and Intentionality},pages = {87--113},author = {Jason Stanley},volume = {151},number = {1},abstract = {Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the "direct reference" theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker's view of content is thus threatened by Frege's Puzzle. Stalnaker's classic paper "Assertion" is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker's claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in "Assertion" is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege's Puzzle},journal = {Philosophical Studies},year = {2010}}@

has title

• "Assertion" and Intentionality

is published in

• 2010

last page

• 113