Meta Ontology

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• 697

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• @article{Mantegani2013-MANIIN,pages = {697--715},journal = {Philosophical Studies},number = {3},abstract = {In order to avoid the problems faced by standard realist analyses of the ''relation'' of instantiation, Baxter and, following him, Armstrong each analyze the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of their partial identity. I introduce two related conceptions of partial identity, one mereological and one non-mereological, both of which require at least one of the relata of the partial identity ''relation'' to be complex. I then introduce a second non-mereological conception of partial identity, which allows for both relata to be simple. I take these three conceptions to exhaust the plausible ways of construing two entities as being partially identical. I then argue that there is no analysis (including those offered by Baxter and Armstrong) of a universal and a particular as being partially identical consistent with any of these three conceptions that (i) is coherent, (ii) is consistently realist, (iii) does not lead to absurd consequences, and (iv) offers a ''solution'' to the problem of instantiation that avoids the problems with the other standard realist responses. In so arguing, I offer a criticism of the analysis of instantiation as partial identity that is independent of the standard criticism that it entails the necessity of predication},volume = {163},title = {Instantiation is Not Partial Identity},author = {Nicholas Mantegani},year = {2013}}@

has title

• Instantiation is Not Partial Identity

is published in

• 2013

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• 715