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http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#publication_269
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Against \_Truth\_ en rdfs:label

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  • first page

    • 147

  • has Bibtex metadata

    • @article{Asay2014-ASAAEC,year = {2014},pages = {147--164},title = {Against \_Truth\_},number = {1},journal = {Erkenntnis},author = {Jamin Asay},abstract = {I argue that there is no metaphysically substantive property of truth. Although many take this thesis to be central to deflationism about truth, it is sometimes left unclear what a metaphysically substantive property of truth is supposed to be. I offer a precise account by relying on the distinction between the property and concept of truth. Metaphysical substantivism is the view that the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes). I then offer two new arguments against metaphysical substantivism that employ ideas involving recombination and truthmaking. First, I argue that there are no theoretically compelling reasons to posit the existence of a metaphysically substantive property of truth. Secondly, I argue that if we do posit the existence of such a property, then we end up with a view that is either contradictory or unmotivated. What we're left with is a metaphysically deflationary account of the property of truth that fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of truthmaker theory, and that is consistent with both the view that truth is a deflated, explanatorily impotent concept and the view that truth is an explanatorily powerful (though primitive) concept},volume = {79}}@

  • has title

    • Against \_Truth\_

  • is published in

    • 2014

  • last page

    • 164