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http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#publication_1659
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A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic en rdfs:label

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  • first page

    • 305

  • has Bibtex metadata

    • @article{McKeon2005-MCKADO,number = {3},author = {M. McKeon},journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},abstract = {This paper responds to criticism of the Kripkean account of logical truth in first-order modal logic. The criticism, largely ignored in the literature, claims that when the box and diamond are interpreted as the logical modality operators, the Kripkean account is extensionally incorrect because it fails to reflect the fact that all sentences stating truths about what is logically possible are themselves logically necessary. I defend the Kripkean account by arguing that some true sentences about logical possibility are not logically necessary},pages = {305--326},title = {A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic},volume = {34},year = {2005}}@

  • has title

    • A Defense of the Kripkean Account of Logical Truth in First-Order Modal Logic

  • is published in

    • 2005

  • last page

    • 326