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http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#abstract_2175
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abstract of The Reality of Absences en rdfs:label

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    • In this paper, I make a contribution to a naturalistically-minded theory of truthmakers by proposing a solution to the nasty problem of truthmakers for negative truths. After formulating the difficulty, I consider and reject a number of solutions to the problem, including Armstrong's states of affairs of totality, incompatibility accounts, and JC $<$span class='Hi'$>$Beall$<$/span$>$'s polarity view. I then defend the position that absences of truthmakers are real and are responsible for making negative truths true (and positive falsehoods false). According to the positive account of absences I offer, absences of contingent states of affairs are causally relevant mind-independent features of the physical world, located within space and time, and capable of being discovered by scientific inquiry. Recognition of the reality of absences strengthens truthmaker theory as a naturalistic metaphysics, as truth and falsity of each and every contingent proposition finds an ontological grounding in some region of the physical universe.

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