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Why Propositions Cannot Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances en rdfs:label

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  • first page

    • 267

  • has Bibtex metadata

    • @article{Soames2008-SOAWPC,number = {3},abstract = {No semantic theory satisfying certain natural constraints can identify the semantic contents of sentences (the propositions they express), with sets of circumstances in which the sentences are true--no matter how fine-grained the circumstances are taken to be. An objection to the proof is shown to fail by virtue of conflating model-theoretic consequence between sentences with truth-conditional consequence between the semantic contents of sentences. The error underlines the impotence of distinguishing semantics, in the sense of a truth-based theory of logical consequence, and semantics, in the sense of a theory of meaning.},journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},year = {2008},volume = {37},pages = {267--276},title = {Why Propositions Cannot Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances},author = {Scott Soames}}@

  • has title

    • Why Propositions Cannot Be Sets of Truth-Supporting Circumstances

  • is published in

    • 2008

  • last page

    • 276