Meta Ontology

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• 1111

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• @article{Vance2014-VANDMT,number = {4},abstract = {Several philosophers have recently suggested that truths about unactualized metaphysical possibilities are true in virtue of the existence of actual objects and their dispositional properties. For example, on this view, it is true that unicorns are metaphysically possible only if some actual object has (or had) the disposition to bring it about that there are unicorns. This view, a dispositionalist version of what has recently been dubbed ''The New Actualism,'' is a proposal about the nature of modal truthmakers. But, I will argue, this proposal entails much more than that. Here, I will demonstrate that, if the modal truthmakers are the dispositional properties of actual objects, then either (i) there exists one or more causally potent necessary beings, or (ii) necessarily, there exists an actually infinite number of contingent beings.},author = {Chad Vance},journal = {Philosophia},year = {2014},volume = {42},title = {Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Necessary Origin},pages = {1111--1127}}@

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• Dispositional Modal Truthmakers and the Necessary Origin

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• 2014

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• 1127