Meta Ontology

first page

• 5

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• @article{Leary2007-LEANKT,abstract = {Theoretical identity statements of the form "water is H2O are allegedly necessary truths knowable a posteriori, and assert that nothing could be water and not be H2O. The necessary a posteriori nature of these identity claims has been taken by Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan to justify a move from talk of reference (language) to talk of essence (metaphysics), and has motivated much of contemporary essentialism. In this paper I will contest this move from reference to essence, and argue that (i.) the only way to derive essentialism from semantics (specifically direct reference) is to assume it as a premise, (ii.) that contemporary essentialism is a metaphysical assumption not a thesis, and (iii.) -- assuming the accuracy of the analogy between proper names and natural kind terms -- present an alternative version of natural kinds classification that is interest-relative, dependent on practical application and reflects the contingent state of affairs which is our world.},year = {2007},number = {1},pages = {5--13},author = {Nigel Leary},publisher = {Durham University, Philosophy Department},title = {Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or Promiscuous Realism?},volume = {34},journal = {Philosophical Writings}}@

has title

• Natural Kinds: (Thick) Essentialism or Promiscuous Realism?

is published in

• 2007

last page

• 13