Meta Ontology

first page

• 326

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• @article{Witmer2005-WITIWN,author = {D. Gene Witmer and William Butchard and Kelly Trogdon},abstract = {Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of" notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."},journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},volume = {70},pages = {326--350},year = {2005},number = {2},title = {Intrinsicality Without Naturalness}}@

has title

• Intrinsicality Without Naturalness

is published in

• 2005

last page

• 350