IRI
http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#abstract_421
| Label | Language | Type |
|---|---|---|
| abstract of What Can the Problem of Mixed Inferences Teach Us About Alethic Pluralism? | en | rdfs:label |
Annotations
-
has text
-
Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or ''heavyweight''. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true in virtue of there being something -- a truth-maker -- in the world that makes them so.2
-