Meta Ontology

first page

• 195

has Bibtex metadata

• @article{Ford2012-FORODA,journal = {Metaphysica},volume = {13},author = {Sharon R. Ford},title = {Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar's Critique of Sydney Shoemaker's Causal Theory of Properties},pages = {195--215},number = {2},abstract = {Sydney Shoemaker's causal theory of properties is an important starting place for some contemporary metaphysical perspectives concerning the nature of properties. In this paper, I discuss the causal and intrinsic criteria that Shoemaker stipulates for the identity of genuine properties and relations, and address George Molnar's criticism that holding both criteria presents an unbridgeable hypothesis in the causal theory of properties. The causal criterion requires that properties and relations contribute to the causal powers of objects if they are to be deemed genuine rather than `mere-Cambridge'. The intrinsic criterion requires that all genuine properties and relations be intrinsic. Molnar's S-property argument says that these criteria conflict if one considers extrinsic spatiotemporal properties and relations to contribute causally. In this paper, I argue that a solution to the contradiction that Molnar identifies involves a denial of discreteness between objects, leading to a power holist perspective and a resulting deflationary account of intrinsicality},year = {2012}}@

has title

• Objects, Discreteness, and Pure Power Theories: George Molnar's Critique of Sydney Shoemaker's Causal Theory of Properties

is published in

• 2012

last page

• 215