Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2010

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Cameron2010-CAMNAT-3,pages = {401--415},title = {Necessity and Triviality},volume = {88},abstract = {In this paper I argue that there are some sentences whose truth makes no demands on the world, being trivially true in that their truth-conditions are trivially met. I argue that this does not amount to their truth-conditions being met necessarily: we need a non-modal understanding of the notion of the demands the truth of a sentence makes, lest we be blinded to certain conceptual possibilities. I defend the claim that the truths of pure mathematics and set theory are trivially true, and hence accepting their truth brings no ontological commitment; I further defend the claim that the truths of applied mathematics and set theory do not demand the existence of numbers or sets. While the notion of a demand must not be reduced to anything modal, I nonetheless argue that sentences that are trivially true must also be necessary, lest we violate a very weak version of the principle that truth depends on the world. I further argue that all necessary truths are trivially true, lest we admit unexplained necessities. I end by showing one important consequence of this: I argue that if there are truthmakers for intrinsic predications, they must be states of affairs rather than tropes},journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},year = {2010},author = {Ross P. Cameron},number = {3}}@

ma tytuł

• Necessity and Triviality

ostatnia strona

• 415

pierwsza strona

• 401