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The Logical Function of `That', or Truth, Propositions and Sentences en rdfs:label

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  • first page

    • 67

  • has Bibtex metadata

    • @article{Harrison2004-HARTLF,author = {Jonathan Harrison},title = {The Logical Function of `That', or Truth, Propositions and Sentences},pages = {67--96},year = {2004},journal = {Philosophy},abstract = {(i) It is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false. It is true `Dogs bark' does not make sense. It is true that dogs bark does. (ii) and (iii) Davidson wrong about `that'. (iv) The difference between `implies' and `if ... then ...'. (v), (vi), (vii) and (viii) Russell, not Quine, right about the subject matter of logic. (ix) The objectual and substitutional interpretations of quantifiers compatible. (x), (xi), (xii), (xiii), (xiv), (xv) and (xvi) Implications for well-known theories of truth; truth correspondence. (xvii), (xviii) and (xix) and (xx) Implications for the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the principle of non-contradiction. (xxi) Recapitulation. (xxii) `That' and entailment. (xxiii) Propositions not entities, subsistent or otherwise. Footnotes1 This article was stimulated by some remarks by J. J. C. Smart in criticism of a piece of work (God, Freedom and Immortality, Ashgate, 1999) that he was kind enough to read for me. I am greatly indebted to my friend David Rees for correcting the manuscript, and making some valuable suggestions concerning its content.},number = {1},volume = {79}}@

  • has title

    • The Logical Function of `That', or Truth, Propositions and Sentences

  • is published in

    • 2004

  • last page

    • 96