Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2012

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @incollection{Lowe2012-LOWANS,publisher = {Cambridge University Press},abstract = {Following the lead of Gustav Bergmann ( 1967 ), if not his precise terminology, ontologies are sometimes divided into those that are `relational' and those that are `constituent' (Wolterstorff 1970 ). Substance ontologies in the Aristotelian tradition are commonly thought of as being constituent ontologies, because they typically espouse the hylemorphic dualism of Aristotle 's Metaphysics -- a doctrine according to which an individual substance is always a combination of matter and form. But an alternative approach drawing more on the fourfold ontological scheme of Aristotle's Categories is not committed to this doctrine and may regard individual (or `primary') substances as having no constituent structure, their only possible complexity residing in their possession, in some cases, of a multiplicity of substantial parts. However, as we shall see, this doesnot imply that such an ontology falls instead into the relational camp:for although it invokes, in addition to the category of individual substance, also those of substantial kind (`secondary' substance), attribute, and mode (or `individual accident'), it need not and arguably should not take there to be external relations between entities in the different categories. On this view, truths of exemplification and instantiation, such as `Dobbin is white' and `Dobbin is a horse', do not need relational truthmakers. Hence, it can be maintained that there are no such relations as `exemplification' and `instantiation', at most only certain relational truths of exemplification and instantiation -- truths whose logical form is relational. Th is being so, I shall argue, such an ontology cannot fairly be classified as a `relational' one.},author = {E. J. Lowe},booktitle = {Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics},pages = {229--248},title = {A Neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology: Neither Relational nor Constituent},editor = {Tuomas E. Tahko},year = {2012}}@

ma tytuł

• A Neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology: Neither Relational nor Constituent

ostatnia strona

• 248

pierwsza strona

• 229