@article{Sattig2012-SATTPO,author = {Thomas Sattig},number = {3},title = {The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects},year = {2012},pages = {594--623},abstract = {What happens to a person in a case of ssion? Does it survive? Does it go out of existence? Or is the outcome indeterminate? Since each description of ssion based on the persistence conditions associated with our ordinary concept of a person seems to clash with one or more platitudes of common sense about the spatiotemporal prole of macroscopic objects, ssion threatens the common-sense conception of persons with inconsistency. Standard responses to this paradox agree that the common-sense conception of persons is unstable, differing over which part of the conception requires revision. I will show that this entrenched view of ssion is not compulsory. I will develop a solution to the paradox that maintains the consistency of the common-sense conception of persons on the basis of an ontology of persons and other ordinary objects as double-layered compounds. Each of various descriptions of the outcome of personal ssion is compatible with principles about the spatiotemporal prole of persons, because the descriptions and the principles manifest dierent perspectives on persons and are made true or false by dierent ontological components of the latter. What holds for the ssion of persons, holds for the ssion of other kinds of objects},journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},volume = {85}}@
ma tytuł
The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects