@article{Leitgeb2005-LEIWTD,pages = {155--192},volume = {34},title = {What Truth Depends On},abstract = {What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence \ensuremath{\phi} is said to depend on a set \ensuremath{\Phi} of sentences iff the truth value of \ensuremath{\phi} supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of \ensuremath{\Phi} in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both \ensuremath{\phi} and the members of \ensuremath{\Phi} are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs},year = {2005},journal = {Journal of Philosophical Logic},author = {Hannes Leitgeb},number = {2}}@