@article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2004-RODPAR,number = {4},year = {2004},title = {Paradigms and Russell's Resemblance Regress},journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},pages = {644--651},volume = {82},abstract = {Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.},author = {Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra}}@