@article{Eklund2004-EKLPIC,abstract = {Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that `person' is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are so intimately connected that the entities we should focus our concerns and ascriptions around are, pretty trivially, the persons. In part, my aim here is to evaluate this naive view. However, I will not actually attempt to give a definite verdict on it. Rather, I will identify the assumptions under which the naive view is true, and discuss how to go about evaluating those assumptions},journal = {The Monist},volume = {87},year = {2004},pages = {489--511},number = {4},author = {Matti Eklund},title = {Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy}}@