Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2001

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Barnes2001-BARSPB,publisher = {Philosophy Documentation Center},journal = {Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association},year = {2001},author = {Gordon Barnes},title = {Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists?},volume = {75},pages = {285--299},abstract = {In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in property dualism---the view that some mental properties are neither identical with, nor strongly supervenient on, physical properties. One of the principal objections to this view is that, according to natural science, the physical world is a causally closed system. So if mental properties are really distinct from physical properties, then it would seem that mental properties never really cause anything that happens in the physical world. Thus, dualism threatens to lead inexorably to epiphenomenalism. In this paper, I will argue that the only way for a property dualist to avoid epiphenomenalism is to deny that the human body is strictly identical with the sum of its microphysical parts. I will go on to argue that the only way to sustain such anti-reductionism about the human body is to embrace some sort of substance-hylomorphism}}@

ma tytuł

• Should Property-Dualists Be Substance-Hylomorphists?

ostatnia strona

• 299

pierwsza strona

• 285