Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2014

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Gorman2014-GORTTO-4,volume = {27},pages = {140--154},abstract = {A certain theory of substance, one that grows out of Aristotelian philosophy but which has adherents today as well, draws a distinction between the features a substance has by instantiating a universal and the features it has by possessing a trope. An adherent of this theory might say that a certain cat is red because it possesses a redness-trope, but that it is a cat because it instantiates the universal CAT. A problem that must be faced by philosophers who hold this sort of view is the following: Which features are which? In other words, which features are the ones had in virtue of trope-possession, and which are the ones had in virtue of instantiation? In this paper I discuss this problem, consider and reject a competing view, and propose my own Aristotelian solution. I also raise and answer an objection},author = {Michael Gorman},number = {2},year = {2014},title = {Two Types of Features: An Aristotelian Approach},journal = {Ratio}}@

ma tytuł

• Two Types of Features: An Aristotelian Approach

ostatnia strona

• 154

pierwsza strona

• 140