Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2003

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Sider2003-SIDAVE,number = {1-2},year = {2003},abstract = {In my book Four-dimensionalism (chapter 4, section 9), I argued that fourdimensionalism -- the doctrine of temporal parts -- follows from several other premises, chief among which is the premise that existence is never vague. Kathrin Koslicki (preceding article) claims that the argument fails since its crucial premise is unsupported, and is dialectically inappropriate to assume in the context of arguing for four-dimensionalism. Since the relationship between four-dimensionalism and the non-vagueness of existence is not perfectly transparent, I think the argument would retain some interest even if the premise were wholly unsupported; it would show that anyone who accepts that premise (which seems reasonable enough to me though perhaps not to others) must accept four-dimensionalism. Still, Koslicki is right that my defense of the premise was thin. So I will now try to do better. The new defense will have further premises, which could ultimately be rejected by opponents of four-dimensionalism, and so the argument retains the form: anyone who thinks certain things (which seem reasonable enough to me though perhaps not to others) must believe four-dimensionalism. But that's metaphysics for you. I should also say that, in addition to the material on vague existence, there is more in Koslicki's excellent paper which I cannot discuss here. I agree with much of it;1 and where we disagree there are formidable challenges, some of which I hope to address in the future},pages = {135--146},title = {Against Vague Existence},author = {Theodore Sider},volume = {114},journal = {Philosophical Studies}}@

ma tytuł

• Against Vague Existence

ostatnia strona

• 146

pierwsza strona

• 135