@article{Rodriguez-Pereyra2001-RODRNA,pages = {395--408},volume = {79},author = {Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra},abstract = {Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals.},year = {2001},number = {3},journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy},title = {Resemblance Nominalism and Russell's Regress}}@