Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2005

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Pages2005-PAGTAS-2,number = {2},author = {Joan Pag\`es},year = {2005},journal = {Theoria},abstract = {In his criticism of Armstrong's argument against nominalism, Parsons (1999) makes a crucial use of a notion of truthmaking in terms of weak supervenience which assumedly: (i) does not entail truthmaker es-sentialism, (ii) is neutral as to the issue of nominalism, and (iii) is useful in Armstrong's argument against Ryle. I will try to show that Parsons' notion is defective because it does not preserve the explanatory char-acter of truthmakers. Besides, I argue that the natural reformulation of the notion in terms of strong super-venience fails in two respects: (i) it is not neutral as to the issue of nominalism and (ii) it does not preserve the explanatory character of truthmakers if it succeeds in avoiding truthmaker essentialism. As a corollary, Armstrong's truthmaker argument against nominalism is vindicated.},title = {Truthmaking and Supervenience},volume = {20},pages = {191--197},publisher = {Universidad Del Pa\'is Vasco}}@

ma tytuł

• Truthmaking and Supervenience

ostatnia strona

• 197

pierwsza strona

• 191