@article{Diekemper2004-DIETNA,journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society},abstract = {I begin by briey mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Specically, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: rst, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.},number = {3},author = {Joseph Diekemper},volume = {104},title = {Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism},pages = {287--294},year = {2004}}@