Meta Ontology

This article bears on the topic of the temporal persistence of particulars in Leibniz's philosophy. It is focused on an analysis of some passages from definitional notes from the early 1680's where Leibniz sets out his main metaphysical theses. The paper contends that Leibniz analysed the identity of substances within a broadly Aristotelian framework, i. e. in terms of enduring metaphysical items (which are identical and wholly present at each moment of the particular's existence). It thus opposes an explanation in terms of an atemporal substantial form, or law, causally unifying instantaneous states. Moreover it will be shown that (i) while Leibniz had some important insights into the possibility of what recent philosophers labelled a "perdurantist" account of persistence, (ii) he nevertheless had strong reasons given other theses of his system to reject an ontology of aggregates made of temporal parts in favour of a traditional, "endurantist" conception