Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2004

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Field2004-HARTCO-5,author = {Harty Field},abstract = {If properties are to play a useful role in semantics, it is hard to avoid assuming the na\"ive theory of properties: for any predicate \ensuremath{\Theta}(x), there is a property such that an object o has it if and only if \ensuremath{\Theta}(o). Yet this appears to lead to various paradoxes. I show that no paradoxes arise as long as the logic is weakened appropriately; the main difficulty is finding a semantics that can handle a conditional obeying reasonable laws without engendering paradox. I employ a semantics which is infinite-valued, with the values only partially ordered. Can the solution be adapted to na\"ive set theory? Probably not, but limiting na\"ive comprehension in set theory is perfectly satisfactory, whereas this is not so in a property theory used for semantics},volume = {54},pages = {78--104},journal = {Philosophical Quarterly},title = {The Consistency of the Na\"ive Theory of Properties},year = {2004},number = {214}}@

ma tytuł

• The Consistency of the Na\"ive Theory of Properties

ostatnia strona

• 104

pierwsza strona

• 78