@article{LeBihan2014-LEBNAM,title = {No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism},pages = {483--497},year = {2014},number = {4},author = {Baptiste Le Bihan},volume = {24},journal = {Axiomathes},abstract = {According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of G\"odelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?}}@