Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2005

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{MacBride2005-MACTPD,abstract = {Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular--universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the (inevitably) piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular--universal distinction are examined: (i) universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; (ii) particulars are related to universals by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; (iii) universals are incomplete whereas particulars are complete. It is argued that these conceptions are wanting in several respects. Sometimes they fail to mark a significant division amongst entities. Sometimes they make substantial demands upon the shape of reality; once these demands are understood aright it is no longer obvious that the distinction merits our acceptance. The case is made via a discussion of the possibility of multigrade universals.},author = {Fraser MacBride},pages = {565--614},volume = {114},title = {The Particular--Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?},journal = {Mind},number = {455},year = {2005}}@

ma tytuł

• The Particular--Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?

ostatnia strona

• 614

pierwsza strona

• 565