IRI

http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#publication_2001
Label Język Typ
Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox en rdfs:label

Adnotacje

Identyczne obiekty

Typy

Object properties

Data properties

  • jest opublikowany w roku

    • 2011

  • ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

    • @article{Greenough2011-GRETGA,author = {Patrick Greenough},journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research},year = {2011},abstract = {Consider the following sentences: The neighbouring sentence is not true. The neighbouring sentence is not true. Call these the no-no sentences. Symmetry considerations dictate that the no-no sentences must both possess the same truth-value. Suppose they are both true. Given Tarski's truth-schema---if a sentence S says that p then S is true iff p---and given what they say, they are both not true. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both true. Suppose they are both false. Given Tarski's falsity-schema---if a sentence S says that p then S is false iff not-p---and given what they say, they are both true, and so not false. Contradiction! Conclude: they are not both false. Thus, despite their symmetry, the no-no sentences must differ in truth-value. Such is the no-no paradox.[1] Sorensen (2001, 2005a, 2005b) has argued that: (1) The no-no paradox is not a version of the liar but rather a cousin of the truth-teller paradox. (2) Even so, the no-no paradox is more paradoxical than the truth-teller. (3) The no-no and truth-teller sentences have groundless truthvalues---they are bivalent but give rise to ''truthmaker gaps''. (4) It is metaphysically impossible to know these truth-values. (5) A truthmaker gap response to the no-no paradox provides reason to accept a version of epistemicism. In this paper it is shown that a truthmaker gap solution to the no-no and truth-teller paradoxes runs afoul of the dunno-dunno paradox, the strengthened no-no paradox, and the strengthened truth-teller paradox. In consequence, the no-no paradox is best seen as a form of the liar paradox. As such, it cannot provide a case for epistemicism.},number = {3},pages = {547--563},volume = {82},title = {Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox}}@

  • ma tytuł

    • Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox

  • ostatnia strona

    • 563

  • pierwsza strona

    • 547