Meta Ontology

This paper focuses on the semantics of statements of the form `x is P at t' vis-\`a-vis its metaphysical underpinnings. I begin by considering four main readings, corresponding to the four basic parsings of the temporal modifier `at t': (1) at-t x is P, (2) x-at-t is P, (3) x is-at-t P, and (4) x is P-at-t. Each of these readings---which correspond to different metaphysical conceptions of the nature of temporal change---is found inadequate or otherwise problematic. In the second part of the paper I therefore consider a fifth account whose advantages over (1)--(4), I argue, exceed its revisionary costs. This fifth account is based on a conception of objects as entia successiva held together by a nexus of temporal counterparthood and reads `x is P at t' as `the t-counterpart of x is P'.