@article{OConnor2005-OCOFWA,pages = {207--227},volume = {29},title = {Freedom with a Human Face},year = {2005},author = {Timothy O'Connor},number = {1},journal = {Midwest Studies in Philosophy},abstract = {As good a definition as any of a \_philosophical\_ conundrum is a problem all of whose possible solutions are unsatisfactory. The problem of understanding the springs of action for morally responsible agents is commonly recognized to be such a problem. The origin, nature, and explanation of freely-willed actions puzzle us today as they did the ancients Greeks, and for much the same reasons. However, one can carry this `perennial-puzzle' sentiment too far. The unsatisfactory nature of philosophical theories is a more or less matter, and some of them have admitted of improvement over time. This, at any rate, is what we self-selecting metaphysicians tend to suppose, and I will pursue that high calling by suggesting a few improvements to a theory of metaphysical freedom, or freedom of the will}}@