Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2006

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Spencer2006-SPETMA,volume = {9},year = {2006},publisher = {Council for Secular Humanism},number = {1},journal = {Philo},abstract = {In this paper I present two new arguments against the possibility of an omniscient being. My new arguments invoke considerations of cardinality and resemble several arguments originally presented by Patrick Grim. Like Grim, I give reasons to believe that there must be more objects in the universe than there are beliefs. However, my arguments will rely on certain mereological claims, namely that Classical Extensional Mereology is necessarily true of the part-whole relation. My first argument is an instance of a problem first noted by Gideon Rosen and requires an additional assumption about the mereological structure of certain beliefs. That assumption is that an omniscient being's beliefs are mereological simples. However, this assumption is dropped when I present my second argument. Thus, I hope to show that if Classical Extensional Mereology is true of the part-whole relation, there cannot be an omniscient being},author = {Joshua T. Spencer},title = {Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being},pages = {62--72}}@

ma tytuł

• Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being

ostatnia strona

• 72

pierwsza strona

• 62