IRI

http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#abstract_737
Label Language Type
abstract of No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism en rdfs:label

Annotations

  • has text
    • According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of G\"odelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?

Same Individuals

Object properties

Data properties