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http://www.metaontology.pl/metaontology_populated.owl#abstract_617
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abstract of Skepticism and Possibilities en rdfs:label

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    • One skeptical strategy against A's claim to know that P is to hold that it is logically possible for someone to have the same ''base'' for P as A does in spite of its not being true that P. Philosophical replies have focussed on showing that these are not genuine possibilities. Whether they are can be an interesting question of metaphysics, but it is argued in this paper that this metaphysical discussion is not the proper focus for an assessment of skepticism. Even if there are the odd logical possibilities, they do not suffice to warrant skeptical doubts. Rather, there has to be good reason to think that there is a genuine chance of the alleged possibility obtaining. This requirement cannot be satisfied generically, and that is what is wrong with generic skepticism

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