Meta Ontology

For many assertions, the correspondence theory of truth seems intuitively to give the best account of the difference between truth and falsity, but one of its problems is how to explicate the notions of ''correspondence'' and ''truthmaking''. In conformity with the view of David Armstrong, it is claimed that truthmaking is an internal relation between a truthmaker and a truth(-value-)bearer. The truthbearer (a token proposition) can exist without the truthmaker (an object or a state of affairs), and vice versa, but when both exist the truthmaker necessarily makes the truthbearer true and correspondence obtains. Contrary to Armstrong's reductionist analyses of internal relations and propositions, however, it is argued that internal relations can have a mind-independent existence and ''add to being'', that truthbearers and truthmakers are categorially different, and that the correspondence theory of truth requires a distinction between internal relations with heterogeneous and homogeneous relata, respectively.