Meta Ontology

jest opublikowany w roku

• 2012

ma metadane w formacie Bibtex

• @article{Wiggins2012-WIGIIA,author = {David Wiggins},pages = {1--25},year = {2012},volume = {20},title = {Identity, Individuation and Substance},abstract = {The paper takes off from the problem of finding a proper content for the relation of identity as it holds or fails to hold among ordinary things or substances. The necessary conditions of identity are familiar, the sufficient conditions less so. The search is for conditions at once better usable than the Leibnizian Identity of Indiscernibles (independently suspect) and strong enough to underwrite all the formal properties of the relation.It is contended that the key to this problem rests at the level of metaphysics and epistemology alike with a sortalist position. Sortalism is the position which insists that, if the question is whether a and b are the same, it has to be asked what are they? Any sufficiently specific answer to that question will bring with it a principle of activity or functioning and a mode of behaviour characteristic of some particular kind of thing by reference to which questions of persistence or non-persistence through change can be adjudicated.These contentions are illustrated by reference to familiar examples such as the human zygote, the Ship of Theseus and Shoemaker's Brown-Brownson. The first example is hostage for a mass of unproblematical cases. The problems presented by the second and third sort of examples arise chiefly (it is claimed) from an incompleteness in our conceptions of the relevant sort---the what the thing in question is. That incompleteness need not prevent us from knowing perfectly well which thing we are referring to. In the concluding section, sortalism is defended against various accusations of anthropocentrism.The paper touches on the interpretation of Heraclitus, Leibniz's theory of clear indistinct ideas, the difficulties of David Lewis's `perdurantist' or stroboscopic view of persistence, four-dimensionalism, and the relation of personal identity both to experiential memory and to the particular bodily physiognomy of a subject. At some points---as in connection with the so-called Only a and b rule---the paper corrects, supplements or extends certain theses or formulations proposed in the author's Sameness and Substance Renewed (2001)},journal = {European Journal of Philosophy},number = {1}}@

ma tytuł

• Identity, Individuation and Substance

ostatnia strona

• 25

pierwsza strona

• 1